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OIL AND GAS 
Upstream 
Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp., ___ Fed. Appx. ___ (3d Cir. 2020), 2020 
WL 6268335. 
Employees sued Driller under Fair Standards Act (“FLSA”) for unpaid 
overtime wages for time spent putting on and taking off PPE and time 
waiting before and after the same. The Court faced three issues raised by 
the Employees: exclusion of Employees’ expert witness testimony, 
summary judgment finding that putting on and taking off PPE was not 
integral and indispensable, and summary judgment finding Driller did not 
willfully violate FLSA. First, the Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of 
Employees’ expert witness testimony because the testimony was unreliable, 
specifically because there was no data concerning the levels of hazardous 
material at the drilling site. Second, the Court remanded the case to 
determine whether putting on and taking off PPE is integral and 
indispensable, as compensable overtime wages are required to be under 
FLSA. Specifically, the Court held that expert testimony was not needed to 
establish toxicity that could render PPE integral and indispensable. Lastly, 
Circuit Court affirmed there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding 
Driller’s alleged willful violation of FLSA and affirmed Driller’s motion 
for summary judgment on this point.  
Siana Oil & Gas Co. v. White Oak Operating Co., No. 01-18-00962-CV, 
Slip op. 6140177 (Tex. Ct. App. Hous. Oct. 20, 2020). 
Appellant-defendant (“Siana”) appealed the granting of a motion for 
summary judgement by the trial court on behalf of appellee-plaintiff 
(“White Oak”) on July 27, 2018. In May 2014 White Oak obtained 
operating interests and began operations in August 2014 as an oil and gas 
operator over a plot of land in Webb County, Texas.  Prior to White Oak’s 
acquisition, Siana owned interest in the plot of land as a non-operating 
company under a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA). Siana continued 
making payments under the JOA, these payments known as Joint Interest 
Billing’s (JIB) promptly stopped in November 2014. Shortly thereafter 
White Oak filed suit seeking damages. Siana answered denying the claims 
and brought numerous counterclaims. In March 2018 counsel for Siana 
filed a motion to withdraw representation. The trial court granted the 
motion in April and provided Siana with thirty days to retain new counsel. 
On July 19, approximately a week before the July 27, 2018 hearing date set 
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for White Oak’s MSJ, Siana’s new counsel filed their appearance and on 
July 24 motioned for an extension of the hearing while also filing their late 
response to the MSJ. The trial court denied the extension motion and on 
July 27 granted White Oak’s MSJ providing White Oak with damages and 
various declaratory reliefs. On appeal, the court found that Siana’s 
reasoning for the delay in acquiring replacement counsel; including lack of 
competence of one acquired counsel, conflict of interest with a second 
acquired counsel, and otherwise inability to acquire timely counsel was of 
no fault or negligence of Siana and the requested extension by Siana’s new 
counsel should have been granted. The extension would have caused no 
significant delay and would not have harmed or caused undue prejudice to 
White Oak. The case was reversed and remanded. 
Mountaineer Minerals, LLC, v. Antero Resources Corp., 2020 WL 5351044 
(Sept. 4, 2020).  
Plaintiff and Defendant dispute ownership of oil and gas leaseholds, 
including the right to extract oil and gas. Specifically, the parties each claim 
ownership of the right to extract oil and gas from the Marcellus Formation 
and disagree whether the leasehold conveyed in the agreement included 
only two wells or if the rights were inclusive of the entire parcels.  
In 2016, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for declaratory relief and to 
quiet title. Following discovery, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment. Defendant appealed and the Fourth Circuit vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case to determine which rights in the 
agreement had been assigned.  
On November 5, 2019, the court granted Defendant’s supplemental 
motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Plaintiff could not 
meet its burden of proof, because “(1) the Subject Assignment pertained to 
the Assigned Wells; and (2) the Assigned Wells … did not reach the 
Marcellus Shale Formation.” 
Plaintiff seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence contained 
in two affidavits. Additionally, Plaintiff asks the court to review the 
affiant’s use of four wells on the property that were not specifically 
conveyed in the agreement. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to Relief from Judgment. Relief from judgment is 
not appropriate because there were no extraordinary circumstances that 
landed plaintiff in the position it is in now. The basis for relief is rooted in 
the clear and unambiguous language in the agreement and Plaintiff’s failure 
to timely gather evidence.  
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Additionally, Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial. Procedure for a new 
trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a) and (b) is only 
applicable after a bench or jury trial. For judgments entered without a trial, 
a party should file a motion to amend or alter the judgement under Rule 
59(e).  
This case is procedural. 
Thoroughbred Assoc., L.L.C. v. Kansas City Royalty, 469 P.3d 666 (2020).  
This case is the latest case in a 17 yearlong battle over revenue from oil 
and gas leases in an operating unit. The issue is whether a lease is owned by 
Plaintiff, the unit’s former operator. If so, Defendant and others are entitled 
to a share of profits from unit production. The lease included a provision 
that allowed Plaintiff to unitize the leases if certain conditions were met. 
Plaintiff unitized the leases when parties agreed, but the conditions were not 
met. Plaintiff now claims that because the conditions were not met, that its 
lease should not be included in the unit. Defendant counters that the terms 
in the lease as to unitization were ambiguous and that the parties agreed to 
allow the unitization by filing a declaration. The district court held that 
Defendant had an interest in the lease from the surface to a dividing line 
within the formations. Based on its finding the court awarded Defendant 
$597,420.95. 
The Kansas Supreme Court determined that the parties waived the 
condition requirements in the lease agreement when they filed the 
Declaration and consistently acted as if the lease was included in the unit. 
The parties also had a duty to read all terms of the lease agreement and 
were therefore should have had knowledge regarding the unitization 
conditions. Equitable estoppel prevents Plaintiff from acting as if the lease 
was included in the unit for three years and later claiming that the lease 
should not be included in the unit because the conditions are unmet. The 
court articulates that this is precisely what the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is designed to prevent. 
Mitchell/Roberts P'ship v. Williamson Energy, LLC, 2020 IL 5-19-0339 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2020). 
This dispute arose over several series of mineral deeds, severable and 
conveyable, executed and recorded in 1913 and 1914. The Severed Mineral 
Interest Act says surface owner is entitled to subjacent support from the 
owner of subjacent mineral interest, waivable by strictly construed 
agreements. The court examined only one of the series, noting its analysis 
would apply to all the other series. The deeds comprised 127 parcels of land 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/9
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sharing similar “together with” granting language and organizational 
structure, granted coal mining rights with ingress and egress rights, and the 
right to construct railroad across the land as necessary for the mining. 
Deeds went parcel by parcel, granting nearly identical rights, and listing a 
Surface Option price for each parcel.  
Partnership, under claim that it is the successor in interest to grantors, 
filed a complaint: (1) seeking a declaration of rights of legal construction of 
several series of deeds’ conveyance of subsidence rights. The lower court 
granted summary judgment to the defending group of energy companies 
(“Companies”) on all counts because of deeds’ “together with” conveyance 
language application as a collective package to all parcels. The lower court 
denied Partnership’s partial summary judgment on count (1), seeking to 
apply the language only to parcel directly preceding the next parcel, thus 
excluding Companies subsidence rights from all but the first twelve parcels. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo, holding that the rules of deed 
construction clearly apply the “together with” language to the parcels as a 
series. The court affirmed that Deeds clearly waived rights of subjacent 
support as a matter of law. The court affirmed the lower courts grant of 
summary judgment to Companies, confirming Companies’ subsidence 
rights in all 127 parcels of land.  
Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Big Sky Energy, Inc., 2020-Ohio-4374, No. 
CT2019-0086, 2020 WL 5413844. 
The Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas 
Resources Management (“Division”) Chief issued three separate orders 
between 2011 and 2013 to the oil and gas production corporation 
(“Corporation”), ordering Corporation to plug three different oil production 
wells it owned and operated and restore the sites. Upon inspection, Division 
found Corporation did not comply. Division then issued two orders in 2014 
declaring forfeiture of Division’s $15,000 bond as a result of the failure to 
comply, and prohibited Corporation from operating any wells in the State of 
Ohio. Division filed a complaint for statutory injunction based on 
Corporation’s violations of the orders to plug and restore the well sites. 
Corporation pled impossibility of performance; the trial court found for 
Division. Corporation appealed, alleging the trial court abused its 
discretion. The Ohio Court of Appeals, Fifth District, held that 
impossibility of performance is a contractual doctrine and does not apply to 
performance of responsibilities imposed by statute, as in this case. Thus the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion on that count. Corporation further 
alleged abuse of discretion in the civil penalties the trial court imposed. The 
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court disagreed, noting the statute allowed the trial court to assess and 
determine the appropriate civil penalty, and that such discretion will not be 
reversed upon appeal without evidence of abuse of discretion. The appeals 
court held no such abuse occurred, because the trial court assessed penalties 
of only one percent of the maximum permissible statutory penalties.  
Peter D. Holdings LLC v. Wold Oil Properties, LLC, No, 17-CV-212-R, 
2020 WL 5406238 (D. Wyo. Aug. 12, 2020).  
Limited liability company assumed all working interest in the contract 
areas of an oil and gas lease from a company that focused its operation in 
exploring coalbed methane gas (CBM) and creating CBM wells. LLC filed 
suit against two oil and gas companies. This court found LLC had a real-
party-in-interest in its accounting claim, however it did not in respect to its 
two breach of contract claims and its conversion claim. This Court 
considered judicial estoppel because: (1) LLC took a position “clearly 
inconsistent with [the CBM company’s] earlier position” in a prior suit and 
the cases are so intertwined that “it is fair and reasonable to bind [LLC’s] 
holdings with the [CMB company’s] prior statement”, (2) this position 
created an impression that the previous court was misled, and (3) equity 
demands estoppel in order to not give an unfair advantage to a party. This 
court found that Companies complied with their obligation in the contract 
regarding the conveyance of depth in the working interest because of clear 
and unambiguous terms in the contract. Companies did not fail “to convey 
any additional interests because [the original CBM company] failed to earn 
them” by failing to dewater the wells, an essential element to wells 
producing gas. Therefore, Companies had no obligation to convey the 
interest. In the second contractual breach claim, LLC breached the contract, 
not Companies. LLC failed to absorb the cost of the wells until they were 
completed, a requirement of the contract. This court found that the 
accounting claim lacked evidentiary and legal support because there was no 
breach of contract. The conversion claim was barred by a four-year statute 
of limitation.  
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the 
higher court as of publication.  
Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Sheppard, 2020 WL 6164467, (Tex. App. – 
Corpus Christi-Edinburg, 2020). 
Appellees filed suit against the appellants alleging “that appellants were 
selling the oil and gas produced from the leases under contracts which 
contain an $18-per-barrel “reduction” in the sales price attributable to 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/9
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“gathering and handling, including rail car transportation.” Appellees 
further allege, “that appellants breached the leases by failing to add the $18-
per-barrel “reduction” to the amount upon which the royalty is calculated.” 
Appellees main argument was that the leases unambiguously required the 
appellants to add any “reductions” before calculating the appellees royalty. 
The issue in this case is whether royalty is to be calculated “at the well” or 
“gross proceeds” from the sale of the minerals. The trial court granted 
summary judgement in favor of appellees on all of the issues specified in 
their stipulation. The appellants appealed the ruling.  
Under Texas Law, “gross proceeds” means the among the producer 
actually receives in the sale of the minerals at issue.” Appellants made 
royalty payments based on their “gross proceeds” but “without any 
additions pursuant to paragraph 3(c),” which is comparable to a non-
deductions clause. The appellants argued that the “gross proceeds” 
language in the leases at issue “necessarily controls over all others.” The 
court found that paragraph 3(c) was highly unique compared to others and 
“shows that the parties intended to allow the royalty base not only to exceed 
the market value at the well, but also to exceed appellant’s gross proceeds.”  
The court reversed the trial court’s judgement on “Stipulated issues 1, 3, 
5, 6, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23…and reverse the trial court’s 
judgement on Stipulated Issue 15 insofar as it concerns the fixed fee of 
three cents per gallon on the sale of drip condensate.”  
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 823 Fed. Appx. 583, 
2020 WL 4515995 (10th Cir. 2020). 
The American Petroleum Institute (“API”) challenged a promulgated 
final rule created by the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”) 
amending civil regulations under the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty 
Management Act (“FOGRMA”). API filed a petition in the district court 
challenging the rule and requesting that it be vacated, in which the district 
court, “vacated one challenged petition but rejected API’s challenges to 
several other provisions.” API appealed to the Supreme Court of California, 
where the court found that “API lacks standing to challenge ONRR’s 2016 
rule.” The court vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded for 
dismissal for API’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
ONRR crafted a final rule amending FOGRMA’s civil penalty 
regulations, that ensured “lessees accurately reported the value of their oil 
and gas production.” The amendment defined “knowingly or willfully” as 
“maintains false, inaccurate, or misleading information,” further how 
ONRR will determine the amount of a civil penalty. API filed a petition 
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challenging ONRR’s statutory authority under the act. The court stated that 
to establish standing, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) injury in fact, 
(2) causation, and (3) redressability. The court found that API did not 
demonstrate a sufficient threat of injury because: (1) “API failed to allege 
any of its members are subject to any disciplinary action under FOGRMA 
as a result and the amendments,” and (2) “API has failed to allege evidence 
of any intention, on the part of its members, to engage in a course of 
conduct that could violate FOGRMA.” The court concluded that API’s 
injury analysis was based on the following, “API’s claims amount to a mere 
possibility of future injury.”  
The court vacated the district court’s decision because “API has not 
demonstrated a sufficiently imminent threat of injury,” resulting in lack of 
standing for API.  
Midstream 
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Lasseter, 823 Fed. Appx. 914 (11th Cir. 
2020). 
Constructor received a certificate to build and operate a natural gas 
pipeline. Constructor filed an action to condemn easements on Landowner’s 
property to build the pipeline. Landowner and environmental groups 
petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) to review 
Constructor’s certificate. Landowner also motioned to dismiss the 
condemnation action, but this was dismissed because Constructor was 
issued a new certificate before D.C. Circuit issued its mandate. Landowner 
was also denied expert witness testimony opining that the property would 
contain twelve lots and be more valuable than Constructor argued because 
this testimony failed to show the lots were “reasonably probable or 
financially feasible.” Additionally, the trial court denied Landowner the 
opportunity to state “subjective fears about pipeline dangers.” Landowner 
provided no evidence to challenge Constructor’s valuation of the easement 
at $24,096.50; however, the jury valued the easement at $103,285. The trial 
court denied Constructor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding 
a jury could have reasonably inferred the property had a higher value. 
Eleventh Circuit faced three issues. First, Eleventh Circuit held trial court 
properly denied Landowner’s motion to dismiss because Constructor never 
lacked authority to build the pipeline because D.C. Circuit’s mandate was 
not a final judgment until all appeals were exhausted. Second, Eleventh 
Circuit held the trial court properly denied Landowner’s testimony and 
Landowner’s expert witness testimony for procedural and evidentiary 
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reasons. Third, the Circuit Court reversed trial court’s dismissal of 
Constructor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because “[t]he 
testimony and trial regarding compensation was uncontradicted” and “the 
jury necessarily had to engage in impermissible speculation” to find a 
higher land valuation. Therefore, the easement was valued at $24,096.50.  
PNE Energy Supply LLC v. Eversource Energy, 974 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 
2020). 
In two separate suits against an operator of a natural gas utility 
(“Operator”), a group of end consumers (“Consumers”) and a wholesale 
energy purchaser (“Purchaser”) sued under federal antitrust laws for 
manipulation in gas transmission markets. The suits arose out of an 
environmentalist group’s report, alleging Operator regularly bought and 
refused to release excess pipeline transmission capacity, thus driving up 
electricity prices in the market by twenty percent. After the cases failed on 
the merits of the antitrust claims, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
examined whether any differences between the two cases warranted a 
different outcome. The court determined that the controlling caselaw which 
guides the application of the federal regulations allowed Operator to release 
or not to release any excess transmission capacity at its discretion due to 
considerations for variable, unpredictable demand. Purchaser further 
alleged Consumer’s conduct differed from the controlling case law because 
of a secondary sale market and because they manipulated a price index, 
which differs from a mere failure to release excess capacity. The court 
adjudged no merit in the first distinction because even a secondary market 
falls within the federal regulation’s purview. The second attempted 
distinction, the court viewed as a mere restatement of the original 
complaint. The court further declined to acknowledge any provision within 
the controlling regulation permitting use of an antitrust suit to enforce that 
regulation. And finally, the court declined to reconsider the controlling 
caselaw to find a different outcome in the present case. The court upheld 
the dismissal of both suits. 
Downstream 
New York v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 974 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 
2020). 
Several states, the District of Columbia, and two environmental groups 
sued National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) to 
institute higher corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) penalties after 
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NHSTA attempted to roll them back. CAFE penalties apply to vehicles 
falling below fuel efficiency standards. CAFE penalties were capped at 
$5.50 in 1997, but in 2016, Congress removed certain inflation caps and 
required agencies to adjust penalties for inflation. In 2016, NHSTA found 
that CAFE penalties should increase from $5.50 to $14 but delayed 
implementing the new penalty. However, in 2017, NHSTA reversed course, 
reinstituting the $5.50 penalty, and finding that CAFE penalties were not 
civil monetary penalties. Additionally, in 2019 NHSTA cited negative 
economic impacts to keep CAFE at $5.50. Circuit Court faced two 
questions. First, the Court held that CAFE penalties are civil monetary 
penalties because they are “assessed and enforced by an agency . . . 
pursuant to a federal law” and were for a specific monetary amount. 
Specifically, the Court held CAFE penalties involve a specific dollar 
amount that is determined via a formula after qualifying credits are applied. 
Further, the Court did not defer to NHTSA’s penalty reduction because 
CAFE were unambiguously civil monetary penalties, and any ambiguity 
would have been resolved after the same CAFE language was used across 
multiple statutes. Secondly, the Court found NHTSA could not consider 
economic factors to reduce the penalty after Congress’ timeline passed 
because such penalties were meant to build off each other and NHTSA 
missed its window to consider economic factors in January 2017. The Court 
vacated NHTSA’s 2019 rule and held the $14 penalty to be in force. 
Federal 
Taylor Energy Co. v. United States, 975 F.3d 1303 (2020).  
Appellant filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims asserting four claims 
involving Louisiana state law: “(1) breach of Trust Agreement for inserting 
an indefinite term; (2) request for dissolution of the trust account based on 
impossibility of performance; (3) request for reformation or rescission 
based on mutual error; and (4) breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.”  
The United States responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction based on the six-year statute of limitations and a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
Appellant contends that claims (2) and (3) should not have been 
dismissed because it properly stated a claim for relief under Louisiana law. 
Additionally, application of trust law for claims (1) and (4) was erroneous, 
because contract law should have been applied.  
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The court did not resolve these issue because for Outer Continental Shelf 
(“OCS”) claims, federal law is applicable if it addresses the relevant issue. 
Claims (1) and (4) are based on the application of La. Civ. Code. Art. 1778, 
which requires the parties to complete their contractual obligations within a 
reasonable period of time when the agreement does provide a specific time. 
But, federal law addresses the amount of time an OCS lessee has to 
complete its decommissioning obligations. Louisiana law effectively limits 
the period in which the lessee can be liable, which conflicts with the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act. Therefore, federal law should be applied. 
Claims (2) and (3) rely on La. Civ. Code Art. 1876 and 1877, which 
provides that a contract is dissolved when parties have completed their 
obligations. But, decommissioning obligations are addressed by federal law 
. Therefore, Appellant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and the case should be dismissed. 
This case is procedural.  
State 
Prot. Our Water & Envtl. Res. v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 10 Cal. 5
th
 479, 268 
Cal.Rptr.3d 148, 472 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2020). 
This case involves “the distinction between discretionary and ministerial 
projects,” which the latter does not require environmental review through 
the CEQA. Stanislaus County (“County”) issues “well construction permits 
under an ordinance that incorporates state well construction standards.” The 
plaintiff’s in this case challenge the County’s practices, “alleging the permit 
issuances are actually discretionary projects requiring CEQA review.” The 
trial court found that the practice of permit issuances were ministerial, 
leading the court of appeals to reverse the trial court’s decision. The 
Supreme Court of California found that, “classifying all issuances as 
ministerial violates CEQA…plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration to that 
effect. But they are not entitled to injunctive relief, because they have not 
demonstrated that all permit decision covered by the classification practice 
are discretionary.” 
A project is discretionary when “an agency is required to exercise 
judgement or deliberation in deciding whether to approve an activity.” A 
project is ministerial when “the law requires [an] agency to act…in a set 
way without allowing the agency to use its own judgement.” Chapter 9.36 
“requires a permit from the county health officer to construct, repair, or 
destroy a water well.” Chapter 9.37 “prohibits the unsustainable extraction 
and export of groundwater.” The court concluded, “the County’s practice of 
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categorically classifying all the permits as ministerial violates the CEQA.” 
The court reasoned that, “when an ordinance contains standards…give an 
agency the required degree of independent judgement, the agency may not 
categorically classify the issuance of permits as ministerial.” The county 
can classify a particular permit as ministerial and “develop a record 
supporting that classification,” but must do so on a permit by permit basis.  
The court affirmed the court of appeals holding that the plaintiffs were 




Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).  
Farmer filed a petition for writ of mandate against Water Supplier after 
the enactment of an equitable distribution plan relating to water 
apportionment. In his filing, Farmer asserted that the distribution plan 
unlawfully and inequitably took away his rights entitling him to receive 
sufficient amounts of water necessary for irrigation. Additionally, Farmer 
asserted claims of breach of fiduciary and taking against Water Supplier for 
enacting the distribution plan. The trial court granted Farmer’s petition, 
holding that farmers retain constitutionally protected property rights with 
respect to the waters appurtenant to their lands and that Water Supplier 
abused its discretion in apportioning quantities of water received by farmers 
at a lesser priority to other users. Further, the trial court entered a 
declaratory judgment barring the Water Supplier from distributing water 
pursuant to the equitable distribution plan, and instead, required Water 
Supplier to employ a historical apportionment method. Furthermore, the 
trial court dismissed Farmer’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty and taking. 
Water Supplier appealed, and Farmer cross-appealed on his claims relating 
to breach of fiduciary duty and taking. The court affirmed the trial court’s 
findings that Water Supplier erred in its apportionment method and that 
Water Supplier’s apportionment method did not constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty or taking. Alternatively, the court reversed the trial court’s 
issuance of declaratory relief, holding the Water Supplier had the discretion 
to modify their apportionment method.  
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Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 2020 UT 47, 469 
P.3d 1003. 
Irrigation companies acquired direct flow rights allowing storage of river 
water in respective reservoirs. In early 1900s, the Fifth District Court 
adjudicated the river establishing the 1931 Beaver River Decree (“Decree”). 
The Decree established priority dates and use limitations of water rights and 
divided the river into upper and lower sections. Users in upper portion 
diverted water prior to lower users, despite differing priority dates. The 
Decree also prohibited diverting water without proper equipment, including 
measuring devices. In 1953, lower user of river water (“Lower User”) 
entered into an agreement (“Agreement”) with upper user (“Upper User”) 
in which both parties agreed not to dispute the other party changing and/or 
expanding reservoirs. In 2010, Lower User sued Upper User for water right 
interference, conversion of water rights, and negligence. Lower User 
asserted interference by Upper User’s direct storage changes and failure to 
measure usage in accordance with the Decree. Upper User filed a 
counterclaim seeking clarification of parties’ water rights under Agreement. 
Lower User lost on all claims and appealed. The Utah Supreme Court 
issued a decision in July 2019 and both parties filed petitions for rehearing. 
The court held, during rehearing, the district court erred in: (1) denying 
Lower User’s motion for summary judgment as there was a dispute 
regarding rights under Agreement; (2) refusing to declare Upper User must 
follow the measurement requirements of the Decree; (3) awarding 
attorney’s fees to Upper User because Lower User did not act in bad faith. 
The court also held the district court did not err in: (4) refusing to declare 
Upper User could not store efficiency gains because Lower User failed to 
show how Upper User’s efficiency gains caused lower return flows; and (5) 
not rescinding Agreement because the breaches were not material. The 
court affirmed and reversed in part and remanded. 
Arave v. Pineview W. Water Co., NO. 20180067, 2020 WL 6110141 (Utah 
Oct. 15, 2020).  
Senior water right holders previously sued Junior water right holder with 
the lower court finding for Senior on their allegations of interference and 
negligence by Junior. Junior appeals this ruling. Senior operates two wells 
that pull from the same reservoir as Junior, who operates 5 much more 
powerful wells. When “Well 4” of Junior’s system operates it makes one 
well of Senior useless and the other almost impossible to use. Court notes 
that Junior’s water rights are about thirty-three times larger than all of 
Seniors’ rights combined. Prior to litigation, Junior was aware of the issue 
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via testing and made an agreement for Senior to pay Junior for a certain 
amount of water. After this agreement ended the Senior brought forward 
this suit. Court notes that determination of interference with a water right is 
a mixed question of law and fact and gave broad deference to the lower 
court on this fact-dependent case. Additionally, while first in time first in 
right applies the goal is the maximum utilization of the water. Court 
reiterated a five-factor holding that Senior failed to show three and four. 
With three being that Senior’s diversion methods are reasonable and four 
being that despite reasonable efforts they cannot access their entitled to 
water. The court holding that Senior had rights to the water but not to a 
specific water table level. Additionally, they failed to make reasonable 
efforts to adjust their welling operations to account for the lowered table 
level. The court found this argument applicable to both of Senior’s well 
claims. The court reversed the lower court’s decision on interference and 
remanded the negligence holding. Since the negligence decision stemmed 
from the interference charge in the lower court’s previous decision.  
Federal 
Ak-Chin Indian Cmty. v. Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage Dist., 
No. CV-20-00489-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 5517307 (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2020).  
Landowner sued irrigation and drainage districts (“Districts”) to 
permanently enjoin Districts from lowering the quality of water that 
Landowner is entitled to receive under federal law and contract with the 
United States. The 1984 Settlement Act (“Act”) granted Landowner water 
supply of at least 75,000 acre-feet for agricultural use, 50,000 coming from 
the highest priority water in the Central Arizona Project. The 1985 Contract 
(“Contract”) added a provision limiting Landowners use of groundwater, 
except during a shortage. In 1998, the U.S. and Districts entered into an 
agreement for Districts to operate and maintain several water distribution 
facilities, including the conveyance facility, a canal, that Landowner 
receives its water from. Landowner alleges Districts lowered the water’s 
quality by pumping groundwater from district wells into the canal where 
Landowner’s water comes from. Landowner asserts: (1) interference with 
Landowner’s high priority water rights; (2) nuisance; (3) trespass; and (4) 
unjust enrichment. Districts move to dismiss for abstention and failure to 
join the U.S., a necessary party. Districts argue the court lacks jurisdiction 
because the Colorado River Doctrine allows federal courts the right to 
dismiss or refrain from hearing a case when a parallel matter is being heard 
in state court. The District Court for the District of Arizona held Districts 
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failed to show how the similar matter in state court would result in a similar 
proceeding. The court also found the U.S. is a necessary party because the 
court is unable to grant relief to either party without forcing one to break 
contractual agreements with the U.S.. Joinder is feasible because the U.S. 
waived sovereign immunity under the Reclamation Reform Act as both 
parties’ agreements with the U.S. were executed under Federal reclamation 
law.  
United States v. Sweeney, No. 2:17-cv-00112-KJM-KJN, 2020 WL 
5203474 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2020). 
United States (“Government”) sued Company for unauthorized levee 
construction, placement of structures, and other acts in violation of the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Government seeks declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Company purchased an island in the San Francisco Bay in April 
2011. Prior to Company’s purchase, the island functioned as a tidal channel 
and tidal marsh wetlands system. Over the years, the island’s levee had 
eroded which allowed the island to naturally return to a tidal marsh. In 
2012, Company began operating a kiteboarding business on the island, 
without a working levee. In 2014, Company began construction of a mile-
long levee on the island, with a permit. Government asserts Company’s 
activities on the island and the construction of the levee harmed the 
surrounding waters and the island’s wetland which caused the island to 
cease functioning as a tidal channel and marsh ecosystem. The District 
Court for the Eastern District of California found for Government. The 
court explained the Company violated, and continues to violate, the CWA 
by being (1) personally responsible for constructing a levee, (2) without a 
permit, (3) by adding pollutants, (4) from point sources (5) to waters of the 
United States. Company argues the court should not grant Government’s 
injunction because it is a violation of the Takings Clause and Government’s 
assertion of Company violating the CWA is an “unconstitutional condition” 
prohibited by the Takings Clause. The court determined Company’s Taking 
Clause defense was not properly before the court and did not bar 
Government’s requested injunction. The court also rejected Company’s 
assertion that the term “wetlands” is void for vagueness as Company claims 
it was not on notice the CWA governed its activities. Court declined to 
determine an appropriate remedy for the injunction until a later proceeding.  
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San Luis Obispo Coastkeeper v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 19-16655, 
2020 WL 628260 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020).  
Conservator appealed the lower court’s dismissal of their complaint. The 
lower court found that the United States, through the Department of the 
Interior, had not waived its sovereign immunity under the McCarren 
Amendment. The previous litigation did not qualify as comprehensive 
adjudication of the United States’ water rights to waive their sovereign 
immunity. Neither the United States nor its impound and usage rights were 
subject to this litigation therefore it was not a “comprehensive adjudication” 
of all the claims. Conservator first claimed that local district’s water 
rights—which were in the prior litigation—equate to the United States 
being involved. This court held that it did not equate to the United States 
being involved in one area, the right to use the impounded river water for 
flood control purposes. Which was the subject of the previous litigation. 
Conservator than alleged that via a “chain of water rights” argument that 
this includes the United States water rights. Conservator stated that since all 
water in a specific area was been apportioned that upstream users who had 
a prior or appropriative right were directly involved in the apportionment. 
The court held that this argument had no apparent legal basis. The court 
further held that since there was no comprehensive adjudication of the 
United States’ right to impound the River water the question of the suit 
being an administration of rights is not judiciable. The court affirmed the 
dismissal.  
Courtland Co., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 2:19-cv-00894, 2020 WL 
6265080 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 23, 2020). 
Landowner initially sued Neighbor for environmental pollution and filed 
a motion to file a supplemental complaint. Neighbor owns a railyard and 
landfill adjacent to Landowner’s property. Landowner alleged that 
Neighbor has stored toxic chemicals within the railyard—no later than 
1971—that have leached into the environment. The same is alleged 
regarding the landfill, which operated from the 50s to the 80s. Landowner 
asserts that Neighbor still illegally operates the landfill since it was never 
properly closed under applicable law. Landowner alleged ten original 
counts ranging from injunctive relief to punitive damages. Plaintiff sought 
to file a supplemental complaint to add a citizen suit under the Clean Water 
Act due to continued illegal water discharge without a permit by Neighbor. 
The citizen suit can only be filed at least sixty days after notice is given to 
the required parties. The notice period allows for the authorities to intervene 
and/or the violators to come into compliance. Landowner provided notice to 
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the authorities; however, the notice period had not expired before the suit 
was filed. After the period expired, the Plaintiff then filed their motion to 
add the citizen suit to their complaint. Neighbor objects on the grounds that 
the events did not occur after the suit was filed—pursuant to FRCP15(d)—
and the notice provided contained insufficient information. The court found 
that the supplemental complaint sufficiently related back. Landowner 
provided notice to neighbor on two occasions that Neighbor allowed 
“pollutants” to enter into the water for decades. The court found the notice 
was insufficient for: (1) alleging information to the complaint that was not 
in the notice; (2) the terms “some ethers” and “wastes” being too broad for 
adequate notice; (3) and failing to provide specific dates and point source 
locations of the violations. The court ordered for the Motion to be denied.  
ELECTRICITY 
Renewable Generation 
Nextera Energy Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 485 Mass. 595, 152 
N.E.3d 48, 2020 WL 5241169. 
Energy company (“Company”) challenged Department of Utilities 
(“Department”) approval of certain power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) 
between a group of Electric Companies and a hydroelectricity producer 
(“Producer”). Company contended the PPAs violated a state statute (“the 
Statute”) by: (1) not adhering to the “firm service” requirement; (2) 
allowing Producer to verify electricity came from hydroelectric sources 
alone; and (3) using the New England Power Pool Generation Information 
System (“NEPOOL GIS”) to track the state’s environmental energy goals. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the Department’s 
decision that the PPAs conformed with the Statute. Company first argued 
the “firm service” language in the Statute required service without 
interruption. The court held it unreasonable to require Producer to 
guarantee uninterrupted energy supply for three reasons: (1) interruption 
may be outside Producer’s control (2) the PPAs required Producer to 
compensate Electric Companies for any supply shortfalls and to pay 
penalties; and (3) PPAs allowed Producer not to supply hydroelectricity to 
Electric Companies during negative local marginal pricing (LMP) periods 
in support of the Statute’s intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
other environmental goals. Company then argued Department was required 
to verify hydroelectricity supplied to Electric Companies came from 
hydroelectric sources alone under the laws of physics. The court held as 
long as the PPAs contractually required Producer to supply only 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
530 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
hydroelectricity generated energy, Department was not required to ensure 
no other energy source contaminated the supply lines before the supplied 
energy reached Electric Companies. Lastly, Company argued NEPOOL 
GIS was not a sufficient tracking system. The court held NEPOOL GIS was 
sufficient because it was well-established, and it was the industry standard. 
Ultimately, the court rejected all of Company’s challenges to the PPAs, and 
upheld Department’s approval.   
Rate 
S.C. Costal Conservation League v. Dominion Energy S.C, Inc., No. 2018-
001165, 2020 WL 5405398 (S.C. filed Sept. 9, 2020). 
The Public Service Commission (“PSC”) sets rates an electric utility 
must pay to qualifying energy producers (collectively “Qualifying 
Facilities”) for electricity the company will then sell to customers. Two 
environmental protection organizations (collectively “Organizations”) and a 
solar business alliance (“Business Alliance”) appealed a 2018 PSC rate 
order. Organizations were not Qualifying Facilities, and Business Alliance 
represented only one Qualifying Facility. The Supreme Court of South 
Carolina dismissed Organizations’ appeal due to lack of standing, and 
dismissed Business Alliance’s appeal due to mootness. Under federal law, 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) requires electric 
utilities to offer to purchase renewable energy from Qualifying Facilities. In 
2018, South Carolina required PSC to set rates for purchasing renewable 
energy from Qualifying Facilities. In 2019, the General Assembly enacted 
the South Carolina Energy Freedom Act (“Act”), which set forth new 
procedures for the PSC to set rates for renewable energy under PURPA. 
Only a party in interest may appeal a PSC order, therefore, because the 
rates only impact Qualifying Facilities, the court held Organizations did not 
have standing to appeal the 2018 PSC order. Additionally, the court held 
Organizations’ intervention at the PSC hearing did not give Organizations a 
right to appeal a PSC order, and further, Organizations did not have 
associational standing because none of their members had an individual 
right to sue. Next, the court held Business Alliance’s appeal for two 2018 
PSC rates as moot, because the Act superseded one rate, and the other 2018 
rate did not apply to Business Alliance’s represented Qualifying Facility. 
Additional issues raised by Business Alliance were also considered moot 
because the 2019 Act addressed them directly. Because Organizations 
lacked standing to appeal, and Business Alliance’s appeal was moot, the 
court dismissed all claims. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/9
2021]        Recent Case Decisions 531 
  
 
I believe this is a procedural opinion only. The opinion addresses 
dismissal of all claims on appeal for lack of standing and mootness; there is 
no substantive law addressed in this opinion. 
T&B 
Bankruptcy 
White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, 2020 OK 89, ___ 
P.3d ____.  
Several Vendors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against 
Operator after non-payment of various contracts. Operator subsequently 
filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 in a separate 
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court transferred Operator’s voluntary 
petition and consolidated into a single proceeding with the Vendors’ 
involuntary petition. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Vendors filed 
adversary proceedings seeking adjudication of statutory lien claims 
pursuant to Oklahoma statute against Operator’s interests and established 
trust fund claims under Oklahoma statute. Operator filed two counter 
adversary proceedings seeking (1) adjudication of mechanic’s and 
materialman’s liens and (2) a directive to purchasers to turn over money 
held in suspense after purchasers received lien notices from mechanic’s and 
materialman’s lien claimants. The bankruptcy court stayed the Vendor’s 
adversary proceedings. Because of the adversary proceedings filed by both 
parties, the bankruptcy court certified two questions to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court to aid in the resolution of the proceedings. The bankruptcy 
court asked the court to interpret (1) whether Oklahoma statute limits 
revenue held in trust for payment of lienable claims from non-operator joint 
working interest owners, and (2) whether Oklahoma statute grants operators 
and non-operating working interest owners a lien that is superior to any 
subsequent claim by the holder of a mechanic’s and materialman’s lien. In 
its answer to the first question, the court determined that Oklahoma statute 
does not limit types of revenue held in trust, and instead applies to all 
lienable claims. In its answer to the second question, the court found that 
Oklahoma statute also does not grant operators and non-operating working 
interest owners a lien superior to any claim of a mechanic’s and 
materialman’s lien. This case remains pending in bankruptcy court.  
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David H. Arrington Oil & Gas Operating, LLC v. Wilhusen, No. 11-19-
00318-CV, 2020 WL 5241131 (Tex. App.—Midland Sept. 3, 2020).  
Former Employee sued Employers after not receiving promised payment 
in the form of an overriding royalty interest or payment equivalent to an 
overriding royalty interest in exchange for a reduced cash bonus for the 
production from a previous project. Former Employee sued under theories 
of (1) fraud, (2) conversion, (3) and conspiracy. Employers moved to 
dismiss all three claims, arguing that withholding payment was a justifiable 
exercise of their right of association pursuant to the Texas Citizens 
Participation Act. The trial court heard the motion to dismiss, but only 
offered a letter suggesting the court should grant the fraud claim, and deny 
the remaining claims. Employers interpreted the letter from the trial court as 
a ruling and subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal. Following the 
appeal, the appellate court informed the parties that the trial court denied 
the motion to dismiss by operation of law. The appellate court upheld the 
trial court’s motion to dismiss denial on Employers’ fraud claim, holding 
that the Employers failed to meet their burden to show the TCPA applied to 
Former Employee’s claims. This is because the communications regarding 
Former Employee’s compensation do not constitute a matter of public or 
community interest, a requisite element for claims under the TCPA. The 
appellate court also upheld the trial court’s motion to dismiss denial 
regarding the remaining claims and remanded the case back to the trial 
court.  
This case is largely procedural. Most of the case is centered around 
whether the trial court granted Former Employer’s motion to dismiss prior 
to the motion’s denial by operation of law. Of the three issues raised, only 
one is discussed in a relatively substantive manner.  
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Federal 
Earthworks v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 09-1972 (RC), Slip. op. 
6270751 (D.D.C Oct. 26, 2020). 
Plaintiffs, a coalition of environmental groups (“Coalition”), brought suit 
in the D.C. Federal District Court against defendants Bureau of Land 
Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, and other federal entities 
(“Interior”) centering around two Rules enacted in 2003 (dealing with the 
Interior and other defendant parties not collecting fair market value for 
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unpatented mining claims) and 2008 (dealing with the amount of land and 
its configuration which a claimant may claim for a “mill site”. Both the 
Coalition and Interior have filed cross-motions for summary judgement. 
The Coalition made four claims, specifically: (1) the 2008 Mining Claim 
Rule and related policies violate the Mining Law and the FLPMA by 
improperly restricting the application of the FLMPA’s fair value market 
mandate, (2) the 2003 Mill Site Rule and related policies violate the Mining 
Law by allowing excessive mill site acreage, (3) the 2003 Rule and 2008 
Rule violate NEPA by not adequately providing for review and public 
comment, and (4) the 2003 Mill Site Rule violates the notice-and-comment 
requirement of the APA by departing radically from the 1999 proposed 
rule. The Coalition established both constitutional and prudential standing 
for each of their claims. The “2008 Rule” claim failed due to the 
determined impracticability of evaluating fair market value of mining 
operations on public lands. The “2003 Rule” claim failed because the 
Interior explained and justified its change of policy. The NEPA violation 
claim failed due to the Interior’s determination that there would be no 
significant effect on the human environment and adequate public feedback 
was received. In summary, the 2003 rule nor the 2008 violated NEPA. The 
APA notice-and-comment claim failed because the Interior based its 
decision to retain its prior position following review of public comments. 
The court granted the Interior’s motion for summary judgement and denied 
the Coalition’s motion. 
WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt, No. 20-56, 2020 WL 6255291 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 23, 2020). 
This lawsuit incurred from that Federal Defendants failed to comply with 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) with respect to twenty-
seven oil and gas leasing decisions across Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, New 
Mexico, and Montana. Federal Defendants, including the United States 
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), moved for voluntary remand 
without vacatur. Plaintiffs did not oppose remand, but asserted the Court 
should order vacatur as the appropriate remedy. Courts in the District of 
Columbia Circuit generally grant the motion to remand so long as the 
agency intends to take further action to review the original agency decision, 
and because Plaintiffs also consent to remand, the Court remands the 
decisions without vacatur.  
The District Court of the District of Columbia held that vacatur was not 
an appropriate remedy because the Court has not had an opportunity to 
review, thus it has no basis to vacate the agency action. Plaintiffs further 
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requested that the Court should impose reasonable conditions on BLM’s 
post-remand decisions, but have not filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction requesting these conditions. Therefore, the Court declines to 
exercise its injunctive power to impose conditions on BLM. 
Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 975 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2020).   
Asarco, a refining company owned and operated a smelting facility in 
East Helena, Montana. Atlantic Richfield, an oil company then leased from 
Asarco, an area in East Helena for a zinc fuming plant, until 1972 when 
Asarco operated the plant. In 1984, the EPA added the facilities to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980 (CERCLA) to remedy the damage done to the environment. 
Multiple settlements and consent decrees were drawn until 2005 when 
Asarco filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The last consent decree was drawn 
in 2009 with the Montana Environmental Trust Group (METG) as the 
trustee to improve the facilities.  Asarco paid around $111,400,000 to clean 
up the East Helena Site. In 2012, Asarco brought a contribution action 
under CERCLA against Atlantic Richfield to help remedy the damages 
during the lease. An initial question regarding the statute of limitations was 
raised and determined timely by the Ninth Circuit.  The district court found 
Atlantic Richfield liable for 25% of the total remedy Asarco paid. Atlantic 
Richfield appealed because the lower court errored in the total amount and 
should be adjusted to funds already spent. Additionally, Atlantic Richfield 
argued that the percentage attached was excessive. The Ninth Circuit 
reviewed de novo and held that the total amount was erroneous because it 
should only include the “incurred” costs under CERCLA, and speculative 
and potential costs do not fall under that meaning. METG had only spent 
about half of the provided funds and had no concrete spending for the rest. 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s finding of a 25% contribution was 
not in clear error. The district court correctly used the “Gore Factors” and 
had extensive assessments of liability allocation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded back to the district court.  
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 17-CV-45 (MKB), 
2020 WL 5519116 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2020).  
Brooklyn Union Gas Company (“Brooklyn Union”) brought an initial 
complaint under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to remedy the damage 
done to the environment by Exxon Mobil Corporation and other oil 
companies (“Oil Company”). Oil Company moved for dismissal under Rule 
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12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim. A Magistrate filed a report and 
recommendation (“R&R”) to dismiss the alleged section 113 claim with 
prejudice. The R&R also included a dismissal of section 107 claims with 
amend to leave because the complaint failed to demonstrate the facilities 
requirement of CERCLA. Lastly, the R&R also recommended dismissing 
the alleged Declaratory Judgement Act because it must be in conjunction 
with a valid section 107 claim. The district court adopted the R&R in its 
entirety and dismissed the claims. Brooklyn Union thereafter filed a second 
amended complaint (SAC). Oil Company moved that the SAC was 
unchanged and moved the court for dismissal again under 12(b)(6). 
Brooklyn Union’s claim was dismissed ultimately according to the R&R. 
Brooklyn Union argued revival of the 113 claims due to a disagreement and 
preservation of the issue for appeal. The district court reinforced the R&R 
and dismissed the section 113 claim with prejudice. Brooklyn Union then 
argued that it pled sufficient facts to render the facilities requirement. 
However, the district court claimed that Brooklyn Union alleged parcels 
into one facility, and parcels that do not share either a common historical 
ownership or a common contaminant, do not meet the broad meaning of 
“facility” required under CERCLA. The district court additionally 
dismisses the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
Pastor Enter. v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 19-21872 (KM) 
(JBC), 2020 WL 5366286 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2020). 
Property Owner sued Automotive Company for contamination of soil 
and groundwater on Property Owner’s property in New Jersey District 
Court. Automotive Company moved under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Property Owner must 
only present factual allegations that suggest with reasonable particularity 
that possible existence of requiring contacts between the party and the 
forum state, such that the claim is not frivolous. Automotive Company 
contended that though its predecessor had contacts in New Jersey, the 
successor did not retain those contacts. The connection for specific 
jurisdiction is that Automotive Company must have allocated the 
predecessor involved in the sale of industrial services and not be engaged in 
other parts of the business. The district court found that these were 
plausible allegations of personal jurisdiction and are significant in 
permitting jurisdictional discovery. Property Owner did not set forth a 
plausible case for general jurisdiction because Property Owner’s attempted 
tag of an agent did not meet the district court’s standard.  
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Wild Virginia v. Council on Envtl. Quality, No. 3:20CV00045, 2020 WL 
5494519 (W.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2020). 
Conservation Groups filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or stay 
of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) action in passing a rule 
that changed and added to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA). President Trump, through an executive order, stated that the 
primary purpose of the rulemaking to change how the government 
conducted environmental reviews, which in turn strengthens the economy. 
The proposed changes was tracked through the administrative rulemaking 
process, and received comments until published in 2020. The rule changed 
the term “possible” to “practicable”, reinforced page limits, and changed 
the specificity of comments on environmental impact statements. 
Conservation Groups alleged that the rule was inconsistent with NEPA 
because 1) it removed the requirement to consider cumulative and indirect 
impacts on the environment, 2) it eliminated requirements for agencies to 
evaluate alternatives, 3) stated that actions must be major before effect to 
the environment is considered, 4) enabled projects to proceed and operate 
during NEPA process, and 5) it reduced the input from real qualitative 
knowledge. The district court concluded that there was not a clear showing 
to succeed in the case. It would likely take interpretative testimony and 
expert opinions for the rule's validity, and the CEQ raising questions about 
standing and ripeness will also require evidence. The district court denied 
the motion for preliminary injunction or stay.  
New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Am. Thermoplastics Corp. 974 F.3d 486 
(3rd Cir. 2020). 
Company 1 settled with the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (NJDEP) and discharged all the claims against NJDEP for an 
environmental cleanup action under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA provides 
incentive for polluters to settle with both the state and federal governments 
for cleaning up sites by making settlers immune to contribution claims from 
polluters who do not settle. The United States sued Company 2 for 
pollution of the same area and sought contribution from Company 1, which 
argued its settlement with NJDEP protected it.  
After first deciding that the United States had standing to appeal the 
grant of summary judgement because the judgement against Compaction 
was contingent on Company 2 getting eleven million dollars from 
contribution claims, the Third Circuit turned to Company 1’s liability under 
CERCLA.  The court ruled that because Congress intended to induce 
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settlements with respect to the sites for both federal and state cleanup 
efforts, a settlement with a state does not protect a polluter from 
contribution claims relating to federal cleanup efforts.  
The court relied on Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner, 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 
1994) to hold that settlement agreements should be interpreted narrowly to 
determine what claims had been settled. CERCLA clearly describes how 
the costs are shared between the federal and state governments, giving the 
lion’s share to the federal government. In addition CERCLA encourages 
suits against only one party by the governments and contribution suits to 
reduce taxpayer funded lawsuit expenses, making it against Congresses 
intention to require the federal government to recover directly from 
Company 1 as well. 
Northern New Mexico Stockman’s Ass’n v. United States Fish and Wildlife 
Serv., NO. CIV-18-1138 JB\JFR, 2020 WL 6048149 (D.N.M. 2020). 
The Stockman’s Association (the “Association”) believed that the Fish 
and Wildlife service had not properly followed the Endangered Species 
Acts process for determining the economic impact before designating an 
area as critical habitat for the Jumping Mouse. This limited the Association 
member’s ability to graze their cattle on federal land. First, the Association 
asserted that the Fish and Wildlife service abused its discretion by failing to 
consider costs of compensation for allegedly taking water rights from 
members. Second, the Association also noted that the Fish and Wildlife 
service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not providing a reasoned 
explanation for why certain units were not excluded from the designation.  
After stating that the Fish and Wildlife service must afford the 
conservation of Threatened and Endangered Species the highest priority, 
the District Court of New Mexico held that the Association had standing 
because the interests it sought to protect, were germane to the Association’s 
purpose and the members had sufficient economic injury in fact. Next, the 
court ruled that the Fish and Wildlife’s decision to use the incremental 
effects because the incremental effects approach is not a legislative rule but 
an interpretive approach is not inconsistent with the mandate of considering 
the economic impact of designating critical habitat. Furthermore, the court 
held that Fish and Wildlife did not abuse its discretion because (1) the 
service has discretion and must act prudently based on the best scientific 
and commercial data available, and (2) the service reasonably did not base 
their judgement on speculative water rights. Overall, the decision to exclude 
certain units of land was not arbitrary or capricious because the Association 
administratively waived their claim by failing to challenge the decision in a 
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timely manner, and the service offered a sufficiently reasoned explanation 
for their actions.  
Swomley v. Schroyer, No. 19-CV-01055-TMT, 2020 WL 5250550 (D. 
Colo. 2020). 
Twenty-one residents (“the residents”) of the Upper Fryingpan Valley in 
Colorado brought an action against Schroyer (“the Forest Service”), 
alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  The alleged violations 
followed the Forest Service’s authorization of a logging project near the 
residents’ homes.   
The residents sued on three counts of violations.  The first alleges the 
Forest Service’s failure to review the project’s impact on climate change in 
violation of NEPA.  The second alleges the Forest Service’s failure to 
consider the project’s impact on mycelium, the vegetative portion of a 
fungus, in violation of NEPA.  The third asserts a violation of the APA for 
failing to produce an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).   
The United States District Court of Colorado rejected all of the residents’ 
counts. The District Court rejected the first count, citing authority negating 
the need for an extensive greenhouse gas emission analysis, because of the 
nominal contribution to emissions that result from a project of this size.  
The District Court also rejected the residents’ second argument regarding 
mycelium because the Forest Service contemplated the project’s impact in 
their Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and concluded that the project 
would impact the area’s mycelium, but would ultimately strengthen the 
surrounding fungal community.  The residents’ scientific evidence to 
support this count was contradictory to the Forest Service’s expert analysis, 
but the court recognized the Forest Service’s discretion in relying upon 
their own expert’s analysis.  The court rejected the residents’ final count 
because an EIS is only required under APA if an EA indicates a significant 
environmental impact.  The EA for this project did not indicate a significant 
environmental impact, eliminating the need for an EIS.  Therefore, the court 
dismissed the resident’s Petition and granted judgment to the Forest 
Service.   
Nanouk v. United States, 974 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2020). 
Nanouk owns land in Alaska near a former United States Air Force 
facility (“the base”).  The base contained hazardous chemicals, namely 
toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”).  Vehicles used by Nanouk to 
access her property tracked PCBs from the base to her property.   
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In 2015, Nanouk sued the United States for Nuisance and Trespass, 
pointing to three actions by the Air Force.  The first action was the failure 
to contain the PCBs during the operation of the base.  The second action 
was the abandonment of the chemicals after operations commenced.  The 
third was the Air Force’s failure to discover and rectify the contamination 
in a timely manner after 1990.   
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that 
Nanouk’s claims were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); 
Nanouk appealed.  FTCA analysis is a two-step test.  The government must 
prove that the act or omission in plaintiff’s claim was discretionary.  If not, 
the government must prove that the decision was “subject to policy 
analysis.”   
The first action failed the first portion of the test because no federal 
regulation or statute directed the Air Force’s procedure for disposing of 
PCBs.  Therefore, the disposal was within the Air Force’s discretion, 
barring the claim.  The second action was not deemed discretionary, but 
was barred by the second test because the action was “subject to policy 
analysis.”  Lastly, the third action was deemed to be within the Air Force’s 
discretion, but the record lacked factual support to show that the decision 
was based on a policy consideration.  The United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the 
Air Force’s first two actions, but vacated the judgment as to the third action 
and remanded the issue back to the district court.   
California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 978 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2020). 
EPA promulgated new landfill emissions guidelines in 2016, and several 
states failed to come up with a plan to comply, so EPA had to create a 
federal plan that would govern in those states. EPA had a deadline of 
November 30, 2017 to make the plan and they did not make that deadline. 
Several states sued to force EPA to come out with the plan. EPA then began 
creating a rule that would give it more time to create federal plans, and in 
the meantime, the district court found for plaintiff states and issued an 
injunction forcing EPA to make a plan within six months. The injunction 
gave EPA a deadline of November 2019, while EPA’s new rules, which 
were completed two months after the injunction was ordered, would give 
them until August 2021. EPA asked the district court to modify the 
injunction and the court declined. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
had to decide whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 
modify the injunction after the EPA’s new rules would permit the EPA to 
blow its previous deadline, which was the basis for injunction in the first 
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place. The Appeals Court held that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to modify an injunction after the legal basis for that injunction had 
been removed by the EPA’s new guidelines, and the case was reversed and 
remanded. 
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 825 F. App’x 525 (9th Cir. 2020). 
Operator appeals from the district court’s allocation of remediation costs 
between Operator and the government under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. The 
9th Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion and clear error in its 
allocation of costs. In 2018, the 9th Circuit sent an appeal back to the 
district court because the district court allocated all the costs to Operator 
and none to the government. TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 885 F.3d 
1142 (9th Cir. 2018). The 9th Circuit held that their mandate in that 2018 
decision was not violated by the district court. They held that the district 
court did not abuse their discretion in allocating the costs because they (1) 
considered the parties’ course of dealings; (2) correctly applied cases that 
that the Circuit Court had told them to apply in 2018; and (3) allocated at 
least some of the cleanup costs to the government. The Circuit Court also 
held that the district court was free from clear error because they correctly 
tailored the government’s allocation to only the costs for contamination 
caused by the use of those chemicals that the government had acquired. 
Similarly, the district court wasn’t wrong to allocate 10% of cleanup costs 
to the government for a groundwater plume because the district court 
permissibly found that sewer dumping related to the plume was most 
equitably related to the government’s role. Finally, because the government 
did not mandate the use of polychlorinated biphenyls, the district court 
permissibly allocated all the costs linked to cleaning up the biphenyls to 
Operator. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in its cost 
allocation or abuse its discretion. The 9th Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision. 
State 
Pennsylvania Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 
358 M.D. 2018, Slip op. 6193643 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 22, 2020). 
Article 1, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution dictates that 
proceeds collected from resources on public land are placed into a trust. 
The Commonwealth (“Commonwealth”) acts as Trustee and the citizens are 
beneficiaries. Legislation over leasing of public lands for oil and gas 
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exploration has brought conflict over lease proceeds. The Commonwealth 
diverted funds from land restoration where oil and gas exploration occurred 
to preserving other natural resources around the state and general operation 
expenses. This prompted Pennsylvania’s Environmental Defense 
Foundation (“Foundation”) to petition for Declaratory Relief. The 
Foundation seeks that: (1) appropriations from the Lease Fund in sections 
of the 2017 and 2018 General Appropriations Acts are facially 
unconstitutional, (2) use of appropriations for initiatives beyond 
Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale Region are unconstitutional, (3) repeal of 
the “1955 Lease Fund Act” was unconstitutional, (4) Section 1601.2-E is 
unconstitutional, (5) Section 1726-G of Fiscal Code is unconstitutional, and 
(6) Section 27 requires affirmative legislation and detailed accounting of 
the Lease Fund. The Commonwealth filed cross-applications seeking 
counter declarations of each claim. First, the court did not declare 
appropriations under the Act unconstitutional, but an accounting is 
necessary before they are consistent with Section 27. The court denied both 
applications. Second, the court granted the Commonwealth’s cross-
application for Trust Fund use for other conservation initiatives per the 
trust’s purpose. Third, the court granted the Commonwealth’s cross-
application because Section 27 does not require the governmental branches 
to provide affirmative measures or written evaluation of amendments. 
Fourth, the court granted the Commonwealth’s cross-application on 1601.2-
E because it is unclear whether transfers were trust principal or income. 
Fifth, the court granted the Commonwealth’s cross-application on 1726-G 
because the transfer of funds from a separate fund does not affect the 
Commonwealth’s role as trustee and no requirement of public notice exists. 
Sixth, the court denied both the Commonwealth’s and Foundation’s 
applications, because it is not the court’s role to direct the actions of the 
other governmental branches. The court granted the applications in part and 
denied in part. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
(or federal) court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent. 
Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 473 
P.3d 294 (Wyo. 2020). 
Brook Mining Company applied to the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality (WDEQ) for a permit to develop and operate a new 
surface coal mine in Sheridan County, Wyoming. After WDEQ staff 
determined the application was technically complete and recommended it 
for publication, the permit has received written objections. After the 
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Director of WDEQ denied the request for an informal conference and EQC 
held a contested case hearing, the EQC concluded the permit application 
was deficient in the areas of hydrology, subsidence, and blasting, then the 
Director of WDEQ denied the permit application. Brook Mining Company 
appealed, meanwhile revised its permit application. The Director of WDEQ 
held an informal conference based on request, and approved the revised 
permit application. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held the issues were moot, and 
dismissed the appeal, based on the mootness doctrine: a case is moot when 
the determination of an issue will have no practical effect on the existing 
justiciable controversy, and a court should not hear it. 
There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but none of them 
applies here: (1) “Great public importance” exception, which generally is 
for issues of constitutional magnitude. (2) The exception to necessarily 
provide guidance to the district courts or to administrative agencies does 
not apply because the legislature already changed the regulatory structure 
for approving new coal mine, eliminating pre-decision contested case 
hearing. (3) The exception for controversies capable of repetition yet 
evading review applies when two requirements are met: (a) the duration of 
the action is too short for completion before its cessation or expiration, and 
(b) there is a reasonable expectation to bring same action again. Neither 
element is met here: WDEQ already approved the revised permit 
application, and the legislature already changed the regulatory structure. 
Sw. Org. Project v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Air Quality Control 
Board, NO. A-1-CA-36398, 2020 WL 6111477 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 
2020). 
Plaintiffs SouthWest Organizing Project, Esther Abeyta, and Steven 
Abeyta (collectively, SWOP) challenged the issuance of an authority-to-
construct permit to Honstein Oil & Distributing, LLC, based on the New 
Mexico Air Quality Control Act (the AQCA), and sued the City of 
Albuquerque Environmental Health Department’s (EHD), which issued the 
permit, and the Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Board 
(the Board), which ordered to uphold the issuance. 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico disagreed with Plaintiff’s contends 
and affirmed the Board’s order. The Court held:  
First, based on the plain language and an overview of the statutory 
structure of the AQCA, even though Section 74-2-2(B) requires the Board 
to apply the reasonable probability of injury analysis when engaging in 
rulemaking, Section 74-2-7 does not impose on EHD or the Board a 
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requirement to independently apply the reasonable probability of injury 
standard when granting a permit, nor this requirement is the only way to 
prevent or abate air pollution. Section 74-2-7 does not expressly require the 
Board or EHD to separately consider health or safety concerns, either. 
Second, EHD and the Board met the requirement of permitting public 
testimony regarding potential adverse impact on a community’s quality of 
life during the permitting process. Additionally, EHD and the Board were 
not required to address public testimony regarding quality of life issues in 
resolving the permit application. 
Third, SWOP offers no compelling reason to conclude that the hearing 
officer permitted the discovery of irrelevant information. The hearing 
officer did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or not in accordance with the 
law in granting the request for discovery. 
Fourth, it was proper for the hearing officer to exclude the testimony on 
causation, and the hearing officer was permitted to apply the rules of 
evidence that govern the admissibility of evidence. 
Chernaik v. Brown, 367 Or. 143 (Or. 2020). 
Two minor children acting through their guardians (“Plaintiffs”) 
contended that the State of Oregon had a fiduciary duty to protect the 
atmosphere and other natural resources from the effects of climate change 
and sought declaratory judgements to affirm that contention. Plaintiffs 
believed that the public trust doctrine extended to the atmosphere, water 
resources, navigable waters, submerged and submersible lands, shorelands 
and coastal areas, wildlife and fish assets in the state, and that the state had 
a fiduciary duty to protect those assets.  
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that only navigable waters and the 
submerged and submersible lands were covered by the public trust doctrine 
based on the history of the common law public trust doctrine in Oregon and 
its past expansions.  The court noted that the doctrine may be extended but 
declined to do so in this case because the Plaintiff’s proposed test was so 
broad as to potentially include all natural resources.  
The court also held that the state does not have a fiduciary duty to protect 
the public trust resources because public trust duties are different from 
common law private trust duties, though overlap between the doctrines 
exists. The duty the state has as public trustee of these resources extends 
only to ensuring that the public has the use of the resources for navigation, 
recreation, commerce, and fishing. The court held that the only declaration 
the plaintiffs were entitled to was that the trial court had erred in excluding 
navigable waters in its original decision.  
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Town of Weymouth, Massachusetts v. Massachusetts Dep’t. of Envt’l Prot., 
2020 WL 5264535, 973 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2020). 
On June 3, 2020, the First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an air permit 
granted by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(“DEP”) for a compressor station operated by Algonquin Gas Transmission, 
LLC, (“Algonquin”) in Weymouth, Massachusetts.  The vacatur was 
ordered so DEP could redo the Best Available Control Technology 
(“BACT”) analysis.   
In deciding to vacate the permit, the court weighed three factors: the 
gravity of errors, the ease of which those errors may be corrected without 
changing the order, and the balance of equities and public interest.  The 
Court determined that the factors weighed in favor of vacatur, but DEP 
would accelerate its analysis on remand with a seventy-five-day deadline 
for completion to avoid further delay.  Since the order of vacatur, DEP 
concluded that it was unable to meet this deadline.  Additionally, since the 
original order, DEP’s preliminary review concluded that the electric motor 
used by Algonquin was in compliance and the permit will not likely be 
revoked.   
Algonquin sought a rehearing on the remedy of vacatur, arguing that the 
delay will inhibit Algonquin’s ability to meet the increased demand for 
natural gas resulting from winter temperatures in the region.  On rehearing, 
the First Circuit determined that the altered the balance of equities and 
public interest factors, now favored Algonquin.  In considering these new 
factual developments, the First Circuit remanded the proceeding without 
vacating the air permit and extended DEP’s BACT deadline. 
Schaefer v. Franzoni, No. C-17-CV-17-000267, 2020 WL 6194702 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 22, 2020). 
Partner A and Partner B jointly own two businesses, Company and 
Shooting Range. Company owns a property and leases the land to various 
tenants, including Shooting Range, which operates a shooting range on the 
property. After allegations of violating the Clean Water Act and threats of 
litigation, the two partners could not agree on a course of action. Partner A 
sent a letter requesting that Partner B consent to several “major decisions” 
including the dissolution of Company and listing its property for sale. The 
Company operating agreement says that if a member requests another 
member to consent to a major decision, consent shall be given if they don’t 
reply within thirty days. Partner B didn’t respond in thirty days, but later 
filed a counterclaim against Partner A. Partner A then moved for specific 
performance of the operating agreement that would have the circuit court 
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enter an order compelling Partner B to cooperate in closing the shooting 
range, resolving the Clean Water Act lawsuit, and selling Company’s real 
estate. The court granted the motion for specific performance because 
Partner B didn’t reply to Partner A’s letter within thirty days, therefore 
consenting to the operating agreement’s terms. The circuit court, rather than 
order the relief requested by Partner A’s motion, appointed a third-party 
receiver to “wind up” Shooting Range’s affairs. Partner B appealed and the 
Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court does not have discretion 
to resolve the partners’ gridlock by selecting a course of action not 
presented by the partners themselves. Because the motion for specific 
performance did not request the court to appoint a third-party to serve as a 
receiver for Shooting Range, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the 
circuit court’s judgment. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
LAND 
Easement 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Heaster, No. 1:20-CV-238, 2020 WL 
6121164 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 16, 2020).   
Corporation responsible for a natural gas pipeline filed for a motion for a 
preliminary injunction against Landowner and his property in West 
Virginia for blocking access to an alleged contracted easement by locking a 
gate on the property and preventing Corporation’s employees from gaining 
access to the easement needed to repair a slip that occurred on the property. 
Corporation alleged the easement provided the only safe access to the slip. 
Corporation had the burden of proving a clear showing that it was entitled 
to the easement under four different factors. Corporation failed to establish 
the first factor, success on the merits, because it failed to establish its 
express rights to use the easement through a valid, enforceable contract. 
Corporation met some of the elements in the second factor, irreparable 
harm, such as safety of its workers, however the court found that 
“unauthorized interference with real property” deserved more serious 
consideration in this factor because of the insufficient remedies to this 
harm, and Corporation failed to prove a real property interest in the 
easement. The third factor, balance of equites, leaned in favor of 
Corporation due to the environmental and employee safety, however the 
court decided the benefit was still not proportional to Landowner’s injuries. 
The last factor, public interest, balanced the state legislature’s express 
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public policy in protecting natural gas resources with the public interest in 
enforcing only legitimate contracts. The court found Corporation failed to 
establish it is likely to succeed on its merits of a breach of contract, therefor 
the contractual rights of Landowner weighed heavier. Corporation then 
claimed an easement by necessity, however it failed to show the easement 
in question was necessary and contended it could ultimately access the slip 
from another direction.   
Other Use 
Crum v. Yoder, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 20 MO 0005, 2020-Ohio-5046.  
This is an unpublished opinion, look to state supreme court rules for 
“reporting of opinions and weight of legal authority.”  
In a 1990 deed, Parents conveyed their interest in the subject property to 
Siblings, excepting and reserving the oil and gas interest to themselves. 
Siblings conveyed the subject property in 1994, including an exact 
recitation of the mineral rights in the 1990 deed. The property was then 
conveyed to Landowners and the mineral rights provision of the 1990 deed 
was repeated again. Landowners transferred the mineral rights after 
producing a notice of abandonment by publication in 2011. The trial court 
denied Siblings' motion for summary judgment and the appellate court 
affirmed. Siblings raised three issues on appeal. This court upheld the trial 
court’s decision regarding the first issue, deciding that Landowners did not 
fail to attempt service by certified mail at the “last known address of record 
holders.” The public record search provided Landowners with the address 
for the property in question and the tax mailing address of Landowners, 
when the deed was conveyed to them. The second issue was a failure to use 
“diligence in searching for the heirs before publication.” Although use of 
“reasonable due diligence” to find holders of the mineral interest is 
required, this Court determined due diligence equated to searching probate 
and deed records, which Landowners completed, therefore this court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision. This court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision on the third issue by Siblings, whether abandonment had occurred 
because of a savings event in the 1994 deed. This error hinged on whether 
the term “reserving and excepting” in the deed was intended to mean 
reserving or expecting. This court held that the deed “’[e]xcepted’ the 
mineral from the grant,” and Siblings argument for the third issue failed. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/9
